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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I show that abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before
colonial rule. I test a model in which exogenous land quality and endogenous population
determine the existence of land rights and slavery. I use cross-sectional data on a global
sample of societies to demonstrate that, as in the model, land rights occurred where land
quality was high and where population density was greatest. Slavery existed where land
was good and population density was intermediate. The model can explain institutional
differences across regions, but not within regions. I present suggestive evidence that this
is due to institutional spillovers.
1. INTRODUCTION
The “land abundance” view of African history is an influential explanation of the eco-
nomic institutions that existed on the continent before colonial rule (Austin, 2008a;
Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). This theory holds that, since uncleared land was freely avail-
able, land had no price, and rights to land were ill-defined. Because cultivators would
not become free workers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employ-
ment. Lagerlo¨f’s (2010) model of “slavery and other property rights” mirrors these ar-
guments. In this paper, I use cross-sectional data on a sample of global societies to test
this view. I show that land rights and slavery existed in those regions predicted by the
model, but that institutional spillovers prevent the model from predicting differences
within broad geographic regions.
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The pre-colonial institutions explained by the “land abundance” view constrained
colonial powers (e.g. Austin (2008b)). As a result, pre-colonial institutions affect cur-
rent performance in Africa (e.g. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007); Tertilt (2005)). Land rights
and slavery, in particular, continue to shape outcomes in Africa and in the rest of the
world. Land tenure shapes investment incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), labor-
supply (Field, 2007), and violence (Andre and Platteau, 1998). Nunn (2008a) shows that
those African countries that exported the most slaves are comparatively poor today.
Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income across countries
and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2008b), as well as long term
racial gaps in education and income (Miller, 2008; Sacerdote, 2005).
The “land abundance” view of African history argues that the continent’s geogra-
phy has given it an abundance of land relative to labor. Geographic features, such as
continental orientation, ruggedness, settler mortality, suitability for specific crops, and
other biogeographic endowments predict contemporary institutional differences across
countries (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn and Puga,
2011). The model I test, from Lagerlo¨f (2010), similarly allows geography to shape insti-
tutions. There are two critical variables determining land rights and slavery. The first
is exogenous land quality. This increases the returns to landownership, compensates
for the inefficiencies of slavery, and sustains greater populations in the steady state.
The second is population, which responds to the geographic and institutional environ-
ments. It shapes the relative values of land and labor and the relative costs of free and
forced workers.
I test this thesis. I use data on a cross-section of global societies from Murdock’s (1967)
Ethnographic Atlas to support a model of land rights and slavery in which the land-
labor ratio determines the institutions that exist. I find that the model correctly predicts
that land rights and slavery were found in those societies that occupied the best land,
and that greater population densities were correlated with rights over land. Slavery was
present when population densities were intermediate, as in the model. While the model
predicts differences across regions, it is not capable of predicting differences within re-
gions.
In Section 2, I outline the literature in African history on how land abundance has
shaped economic institutions. I present the basic features of the model and its testable
implications. In Section 3, I describe the data used and lay out the econometric speci-
fications. In Section 4, I report the results of these tests. In Section 5, I show that these
results are robust to different measures of the institutional outcomes, alternative prox-
ies for land quality and historical population density, and the possible endogeneity of
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land quality. I also argue that this theory of land rights and slavery better explains the
data than some prominent alternatives, including ecological risk as a cause of com-
mon property, and suitability for specific crops as a predictor of slavery. In Section 6,
I demonstrate that the model is unable to predict differences within regions, and that
there is substantial spatial correlation in institutional outcomes. In Section 7 I con-
clude.
2. THE LAND ABUNDANCE VIEW OF AFRICAN HISTORY
2.1. The literature. A first-order task in African history is explaining the continent’s
long-run differences from the rest of the world. The starting point of the land abun-
dance view is the difference in settlement patterns between pre-colonial Africa and the
rest of the world. Herbst (2000, p. 16) estimates the population density of Sub-Saharan
Africa in 1900 at 4.4 persons per Sq. Km, contrasted with 38.2 for South Asia, 45.6 for
China, and 62.9 for Europe.1 Explanations of low African population densities stress ge-
ographic factors, the disease environment, and historical factors such as the slave trades
(Mahadi and Inikori, 1987, p. 63-64). This sparse settlement, Hopkins (1973, p. 23-27) ar-
gues, shaped institutions, because Africans “measured wealth and power in men rather
than in acres.”2 Here, I outline the implications for land rights and slavery.
Austin (2009, p. 33) argues that African land was often “easily and cheaply accessible
in institutional terms”; pre-colonial authorities were eager to attract “more people with
whom to subdue nature and, if necessary, their neighbors,” so that strangers could gen-
erally acquire land indefinitely for token payments. These payments were made solely
to acknowledge the sovereignty of the local authorities. Citizens were given land virtu-
ally freely. Austin (2008a, p. 591-594) notes that ‘islands’ of intensive agriculture have
existed in Africa where insecurity has created artificial land scarcity and in specific lo-
cations of exceptional value. These had minerals, trees, market access, or suitability for
particular crops. Against these views, Spear (1997, p. 154-157) argues that population
density cannot explain individual cases. While on Mount Meru both the Arusha and the
Meru intensified their agriculture as population rose, the less densely settled Meru did
so more readily. Berry (1988), similarly, has noted that inheritance rules, tenancy con-
tracts, and labor arrangements often prevent tree crops from leading to individualized
land tenure in West Africa. Thornton (1992, p. 75-76) suggests that ownership of land
results from legal claims, not population pressure.
1His estimate for North Africa is 9.4 persons per Sq. Km.
2Austin (2008a, p. 589) argues that Hopkins was the first to make this analysis systematic; earlier writers
on Africa did account for the existence of slavery, for example, by noting Africa’s land abundance – see
Dowd (1917).
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For Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), scarcity of labor explains African use of forced labor.
He builds on Nieboer (1900) and Domar (1970), who argue that coercion is cheaper than
paying a wage when labor is scarce and wages high. Slavery was prevalent in much of
Africa even prior to the Atlantic slave trade (Fage, 1969). The use of underpopulation
to explain African slavery is controversial. Writers such as Kopytoff and Miers (1977,
p. 68-69), Lovejoy (1978, p. 349), or Miers and Klein (1998, p. 4-5) have stressed that
slaves were employed in non-economic uses, distributed by non-market means, and
that colonial rulers turned a blind eye to slavery for political reasons. Kopytoff (1987,
p. 46) and Goody (1980, p. 26-31) add that dependents must be “seduced” rather than
coerced, so slavery can only exist in complex societies and states with “well-developed
systems of compulsion.”
I clarify this literature and test its claims. With the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model as a rea-
sonable formalization, the “land abundance” view can be reconciled with some of the
objections it has faced. While high wages resulting from population density explain the
preference for slavery over free labor under certain conditions in the model, there are
also under conditions in which population is too sparse for slavery to be worthwhile,
corresponding with the less complex societies in Africa that have poorly developed sys-
tems of compulsion. More importantly, I test the land abundance view in a global sam-
ple of societies. I show that the institutional effects of population and agricultural pro-
ductivity follow regular patterns even if they cannot explain every case. I show that the
presence of slavery is systematically related to the economic value of slaves and to pop-
ulation.
2.2. Model. I test the model of “slavery and other property rights” from Lagerlo¨f (2009).
This is for two reasons. First, his model echoes the arguments made by historians, mak-
ing explicit the testable implications of their views. Greater population lowers average
product, which is shared equally in an egalitarian regime. This creates incentives to cre-
ate rights over land. Similarly, the relative costs of land rights and slavery are determined
by the competitive wage, which is itself a function of population size. If population
pressure increases labor supply and depresses the wage, free labor becomes profitable
relative to keeping slaves.
Second, his model extends the “land abundance” literature. If population is suffi-
ciently low, slavery will not exist, since population pressure has not adequately de-
pressed the returns to an egalitarian sharing of output while the opportunity costs of
wasting labor on coercion remain high. This reconciles the land abundance view with
the critiques of Kopytoff and Goody. In addition, the quality of land determines both
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the relative profitability of institutional regimes for a given population and the level of
population that can be supported. This variable has been generally neglected by the
Africanist literature. Lagerlo¨f (2009) makes the concept of “land abundance” more pre-
cise; it is the availability of cultivable land relative to both population and productivity
that matters. Here, I briefly sketch the basic elements of the model and state its testable
implications.
The model takes a society in period t with a population Pt of non-elite agents and a
comparatively small elite that does not work. The elite chooses institutions. Output Yt
depends on land M , land-augmenting productivity A˜t, and the labor used Lt:
Yt = (MA˜t)
αL1−αt ≡ Aαt L1−αt .(1)
At the beginning of each period, the elite chooses between three regimes based on
which one yields them the greatest profits piit, where i denotes one of three institutional
regimes. The first is egalitarianism. Under this arrangement, there are no land rights or
slavery. The elite and the non-elite each receive average product, and so:
piEt =
(At
Pt
)α
.(2)
The second possible outcome is slavery. Here, the elite enclose the entire land, creat-
ing rights over it. They enslave St slaves from the population, paying them only subsis-
tence income c¯. Each slave requires γ guards, who are also paid c¯, and so the elite payoff
is:
piSt = max
St≤Pt/(1+γ)
{Aαt S1−αt − (1 + γ)c¯St}.(3)
The third possible outcome is free labor. Again, the elite enclose the entire land. Now,
however, they hire members of the population at a competitive wagewt, which depends
on Pt. The elite’s payoff is:
piFt = max
Lt≥0
{Aαt L1−αt − wtLt}.(4)
Lagerlo¨f (2009) shows that the state space in At and Pt can be divided into three sets:
SE, in which the elite prefer egalitarianism; SS, in which they prefer slavery, and; SS,
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in which they prefer free labor. The boundaries of these regions are defined by three
functions of Pt: Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt), and Φ(Pt).
3 These are depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. Institutional regions and dynamics
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The slavery region, SS, is where At ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)}, and Pt > (1 + γ)1−α. At ≥
Ψ(Pt) implies that population givenAt is still sufficiently low thatwt is high relative to the
cost of keeping slaves. At ≥ Ω(Pt) implies that population is sufficiently dense that the
average product under egalitarianism has fallen, while high productivity also ensures
the elite is willing to waste some labor on guarding slaves in order to take a greater share
3
Ψ(Pt) =
( c¯(1 + γ)1−α
1− α(1 + γ)1−α
) 1
α
Pt
Ω(Pt) =
( c¯(1 + γ)1−αP 1+αt
Pt − (1 + γ)1−α
) 1
α
Φ(Pt) =
( 1
1− α
) 1
1−α
( c¯
1− α
) 1
α
P
− α1−α
t
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of output for themselves. The opportunity cost of these guards is particularly high when
population is very low, which explains both the slope of Ω(Pt) and the condition that
Pt > (1 + γ)
1−α.
SF is the free labor region, in which Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt) and Pt > 1/α. Pt > 1/α
ensures that population is great enough that the average product has fallen, making
enclosure worthwhile. At ≤ Ψ(Pt) occurs when population growth pushes down wages
sufficiently relative to the costs of keeping slaves. The condition that Φ(Pt) ≤ At is of
less interest, driven by an assumption that the wage is bounded below by c¯. SE occurs
in the remainder of the state space, where average product and the counterfactual wage
are both relatively high.
The dynamics of the model are Malthusian and Boserupian. They are Malthusian in
that fertility is increasing in income. Two upward-sloping zero population growth lines
exist – one under slavery and one under both egalitarianism and free labor. To the left
of these, income is high and population is growing. To the right, income is low and
population is falling. These are shown in Figure 1 as LE/F (Pt) and LS(Pt).
4
The dynamics are Boserupian in that agricultural technology in period t + 1 has an
intercept of A¯ and depends positively on both At and Pt. Lagerlo¨f (2009) takes A¯ as
the “minimum level of agricultural technology,” and I interpret it as exogenous land
quality. The result is an upward-sloping zero-technological-growth line LA(Pt).
5 Above
this, productivity degrades, while below this it improves. This is also shown in Figure 1.
A steady state exists where either LE/F (Pt) or LS(Pt) intersects LA(Pt). Figure 1 depicts
a steady state in the free labor region.
2.3. Tests. What are the testable implications of this model and, by extension, the land
abundance view? First, land quality A¯ should positively predict the existence of land
rights and slavery. Land rights do not exist under egalitarianism, and if A¯ is too low, it
is impossible to support a steady state under either regime. Similarly, A¯ must be high
in order for a steady state to exist with slavery. However, since larger values of A¯ can
4
LE/F (Pt) =
( q
β
) 1
α
Pt
LS(Pt) = (1 + γ)
1−α
α
( q
β
+ c¯
) 1
α
Pt
5
LA(Pt) = A¯+D
1
θPt.
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support steady states in both the slavery and free labor regions, the relationship be-
tween A¯ and slavery is expected to be weaker than for land rights. Second, population
density, which I take as corresponding to Pt in the model, will predict land rights and
slavery. While this is an endogenous variable, this is still a correlation implied by the
model and one of its implications. For land rights to exist, Pt must be greater than the
cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt), 1/α, and Φ(Pt). For slavery to exist, Pt must be great enough
that enclosure of land is worthwhile and the opportunity costs of coercion are not too
high, but also sparse enough that wages are not too low. It must, then, be between the
cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt) and Ψ(Pt). It is the implied relationships between land quality,
population density, land rights, and slavery that I test in assessing the “land abundance”
view.
2.4. Other implications. In addition to land quality, A¯ and the state variable, Pt, which
I use to test the land abundance view, there are seven exogenous parameters in the
model. I do not use these to derive additional tests. Three parameters, β, q and α, do not
yield clear predictions for the existence of land rights or slavery. The remaining param-
eters, γ, D, θ and c¯, do give clear comparative statics (see the appendix). The difficulty
is that these parameters are not directly observed in geographic data in the same sense
that A¯ and Pt are directly observed. The geographic controls I am able use are will affect
several parameters at once. Ruggedness, for example, may increase the cost of guard-
ing slaves (γ) through the mechanisms identified by Nunn and Puga (2011), but will be
also impact technological parameters (θ, D, and α) directly, since feasible agricultural
systems differ between flat and rugged areas.
3. DATA AND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, I outline how I test the two predictions of the model described above.
I use a cross section of data on 1,206 societies. In Section 3.1 I detail the specific econo-
metric specifications. In Section 3.2, I describe the sources of data on institutions, the
proxies for the variables A¯ and Pt in the model, and the additional controls that I in-
clude.
3.1. Specifications. The first prediction of the model is that raising A¯ will make it pos-
sible for steady states to exist with land rights or slavery. I test this by estimating:
yi = α + βAAi + x
′
iγ + i,(5)
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where yi is an outcome of interest for soceity i,Ai is a proxy for land quality (analogous
to A¯ in the model), xi is a vector of geographical controls, and i is random error. (5)
is estimated as a probit with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. I expect that
βA > 0 when yi is an indicator for land rights or slavery.
The second implication of the model is that land rights exist at higher levels of Pt,
while slavery exists at intermediate levels of Pt. I test these by estimating:
yi = α + βp ln(1 + pi) + x
′
iγ + i,(6)
and
yi = α + βp1 ln(1 + pi) + βp2(ln(1 + pi))
2 + x′iγ + i,(7)
where (abusing notation) yi, xi, and i are defined as in (5). pi is population density,
the proxy used for Pt. The functional form comes from visual inspection of the data –
slavery peaks towards the left hand side of the distribution, while a strict logarithmic
specification gives undue influence to very sparsely settled societies. These are also es-
timated as probit models. I expect that βp > 0, βp1 > 0, and βp2 < 0. I estimate equations
with log population density and land quality separately, since the correlation between
the two (ρ = 0.36) inhibits joint tests. I do not report results of the land rights regres-
sion with the quadratic term, since an inverse-U relationship is not anticipated by the
model. If I do estimate the equation with the quadratic term, that term not statistically
significant.
3.2. Data. I use two types of data to test the ability of the model to explain institutional
differences across societies. Details of the variables used and their sources are con-
tained in the appendix. The first covers institutions, and is taken from Murdock’s (1967)
Ethnographic Atlas. Published in 29 installments of the journal Ethnology between 1962
and 1980, the Atlas is a database of 1267 societies from around the world. It contains
categorical variables describing several institutional and cultural features of these so-
cieties, usually at the time of first contact with Europeans. From this sample, I remove
2 duplicate observations (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies from before 1500 (An-
cient Egypt, Aryans, Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 51 for
which land quality information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves a
base sample of 1206 societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1041 on slavery.
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics
[Table 1 here]
I use variables from the Ethnographic Atlas to construct binary variables for whether
land rights or slavery exist. Summary statistics for these are given in Table 1. For each
society, I observe land rights and slavery together at a single point in time. I map these
variables by the latitude and longitude coordinates of each society in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Land rights and slavery
Land rights are on top, slavery on bottom. Black circles indicate presence, grey circles absence.
Why use this data? The principal justification is availability. This is the only source of
cross-cultural information on land rights and slavery of which I am aware that has global
scope. In addition, the measures in the Ethnographic Atlas are internally consistent,
having been compiled by the same author.
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The second type of data used includes features of the natural environment. I join
these to the data from the Ethnographic Atlas using one of five map sources. First, I join
African societies to one or more ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959) in his “Tribal
Map of Africa.” Second, I merge First Nations groups in the United States and Canada
with the maps that begin the volumes the Handbook of North American Indians (Heizer
and Sturtevant, 1978), digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for Canada
by myself. Third, I join ethnic groups from the rest of the world to Global Mapping
International’s (GMI) detailed World Language Mapping System. Fourth, if no match
can be found in the GMI map, I use the less detailed Geo-Referencing Ethnic Groups
(GREG) map created by Weidmann et al. (2010). Finally, if no suitable match can be
found in any of these, I match groups with modern administrative boundaries manually.
For example, the Nunivak are matched to Nunivak Island. Not all societies are matched
exactly. Of 1,267, 100 were matched to a different group indicated in the same location
while 76 were matched to a larger group of which they form a smaller part (such as the
Efik to the Ibibio). A full table of matches are given in the web appendix.
Once these matches are formed, geographic raster data is joined to them by taking
the average of the raster points within an ethnic group’s territory. Summary statistics for
these variables are presented in Table 1. Two of these controls are of particular impor-
tance – land quality and population density.
3.2.1. Land quality. The variable used to capture land quality is based on Fischer et al.’s
(2002) measure of combined climate, soil and terrain slope constrains. This is re-scaled
as a standard normal variable between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating an absence
of environmental constrains on rainfed agriculture. This is treated as a proxy for the
variable A¯ in the model.
The constraints measure was constructed as part of the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) project.6 This measure is not par-
ticular to any particular crop or technology, and is a non-additive combination of three
components:
(1) Climate constraints: The coldness constraint is “moderate” if there are fewer than
180 days with an average temperature below 5◦C, and “severe” if there are fewer
than 120. Aridity constraints are moderate if there are less than 120 days with an
average temperature below 5◦C during which moisture conditions are adequate
to permit crop growth and severe if there are less than 60.
6See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm
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(2) Soil constraints: Five characteristics of soils are considered. These are depth,
fertility, drainage, texture and chemical constraints. “Medium” and “shallow”
depth are moderate and severe constraints, respectively. “Medium” and “low”
fertility are treated similarly as moderate and severe constraints. “Poor” drainage
is a severe constraint. Sandy and stony soils are severe constraints, and cracking
clay is a moderate constraint. Salinity, sodicity, and gypsum are severe chemical
constraints.
(3) Terrain slope constraints: Terrain slopes greater than 8% are “moderate” con-
straints, and slopes greater than 30% are “severe.”
Climate constraints and soil texture are exogenous. It is possible that societies that
developed slavery or rights over land were able to avoid degrading soil depth or fertility.
I add the direct measures of soil depth and fertility constraints as additional controls as
a robustness check. An additional advantage of this constraints-based measure is that
it is not based on expected yields in contemporary agriculture, in which greater crop
diversity would be available than for many of the societies at the time they are recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas.
3.2.2. Population density. All historical reconstructions of population are guesses. One
book on estimates for pre-Columbian America is entitled “Numbers from Nowhere”
(Henige, 1998). The principal measure that I use for historical population density is
taken from the History Database of the Global Environment (HYDE) version 3.1, which
has been previously used by Bluedorn et al. (2009). This is raster data on historical pop-
ulation, covering the years 1500, 1600, and every ten years since 1700. For each ethnic
group, I measure historical population density as the average of the raster points within
its territory for the year of observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.7
These population estimates were assembled by the Netherlands Environmental As-
sessment Agency, and the details of their construction are reported by Bouwman et al.
(2006), Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010) and Klein Goldewijk (2005). This data source takes
as its base a map of 3441 administrative units from 222 countries. Historical data are
then reconstructed on this base map using Lahmeyer (2004), Helders (2000), Tobler
(1995), several local studies, interpolation, and back projection. The data are reported
on a five minute grid.
My key estimates of land quality and population density are plotted together in Figure
3. In addition to summary statistics in Table 1, I present the percentiles of the HYDE
7For computational reasons, I use data from each 50 year interval, imputing intermediate years exponen-
tially.
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population data and the two principal alternatives to this data, described below. These
range from nearly zero persons per square mile for several groups in the Mato Grosso
and interior Amazon, to over 3,000 persons per square mile for the Okinawans of Japan.8
3.2.3. Alternative measures of population density. Because historical population recon-
struction unavoidably inexact, it is important to show that the results can be obtained
using alternatives to the HYDE estimates. Because the HYDE estimates are the only
raster data of which I am aware on historical population, I adopt a simple method to
estimate alternative spatially disaggregated historic population densities for the soci-
eties in my data. I begin with raster data on population density in 1995 for each of these
ethnic groups and combine it with other estimates of historical population densities for
the broader regions within which these groups are located. Specifically, my alternative
estimates of historical population density take the form:
Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(8)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
Critically, this assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed
within regions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the
broad region “India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they
are observed. While only a first-order approximation, this approach is preferable to us-
ing the unweighted regional densities directly. McEvedy and Jones (1978), for example,
assign a single population density to all of Canada. To treat the population densities
of the Inuit and Ojibwe groups in the data as equal would be implausible, and would
introduce substantial measurement error on the right hand side.9 In addition to these
two main alternatives, I use the 1995 densities directly, the historical regional densities
directly, and for roughly 175 societies I have access to independent estimates of their
population densities from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) of Murdock and
White (1969). A derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas, the SCCS contains a larger number
of variables for a smaller sample of societies.
8This appears to be a mis-measurement due to over-representation of Naha in the original raster data;
administrate records give a modern density of just above 1,500 persons per square mile. Results are robust
to excluding the Okinawans.
9Ruff (2006) suggests that the Northeast had a population density at contact roughly seven times that of
the Arctic. The method used here assigns the Ojibwe a historic population density of 2.20 per square mile
and the Copper Eskimo a population density of 0.31 per square mile – a roughly seven-fold difference.
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GIS data on population in 1995 is readily available from the FAO-GAEZ. I use two
sources of regional estimates. The first is McEvedy and Jones (1978), who create esti-
mates at regular intervals for 163 regions of the world. There are, however, well-known
problems with these data (Austin, 2008b; Hopkins, 2009). Thus, I also use the ARVE
Group’s estimates, constructed by Krumhardt (2010).10 She divides the world into 209
regions, and gives population estimates for hundred year periods between 6050 BC and
1850 AD.
FIGURE 3. Land quality and historic population density
Land quality is on top, population density on bottom. Darker colors indicate higher values; the ranges of
both are given in Table 1.
3.2.4. Other controls. In addition, I control for several other factors that may determine
the existence of land rights and slavery. These are re-scaled as standard normal variables
10See http://ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=pop_landuse_data.tar.gz
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in the regressions. Definitions and sources are outlined in the appendix. These are the
presence of a major river, distance to the coast, elevation, the percentage of the society’s
territory in which malaria is endemic, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, date of
observation, absolute latitude, share desert, and an indicator for whether the society
derives most of its income from fishing. Summary statistics are given in Table 1. These
geographic controls are intended to capture variation in the parameters of the model
that I am unable to measure directly, i.e. c¯, β, α, γ, q, D, and θ.
Access to a major river and distance from the coast proxy for water-borne diseases
that affect the cost of fertility (q). These distances also capture the presence of trade,
which affects both the production function (α) and the relative utility of fertility (β)
through the menu of goods that are traded and through technological transfer. They will
affect the cost of slavery (γ) through what uses exist for slaves and whether they can be
punished by sale for export. Proximity to markets also affects β through the usefulness
of children as substitutes for insurance and savings. Elevation is related to the disease
environment, and hence q. It also affects the range of available crops and technologies,
and hence α.
Malaria affects the cost of fertility (q) through child mortality and the cost of slavery (γ)
via slave mortality. It may also alter the physical cost of effort in adults. Malaria and ab-
solute latitude are both also for the unobservable features of the tropics that make their
institutions systematically different from those in other parts of the world.11 Precipita-
tion determines what crops can be grown, shaping the production function (α). African
growing seasons and diseases are constrained by the seasonal availability of moisture.
Areas with low rainfall are also those most susceptible to drought. Ruggedness, as dis-
cussed above, shapes γ, α and D. Temperature affects the physical cost of effort, and
hence γ. In hostile environments such as deserts, it is more difficult for slaves to flee; γ
is lower. Temperature affects q through nutrition and disease.
The analysis generally treats the ethnic groups in the sample as if they are in their
steady states. The date of observation, then, is a proxy for the degree of European influ-
ence and other institutional contamination that pushes societies towards a Westernized
recognition of land rights and abolition of slavery. If these societies were to be viewed
at another point in time, there is no guarantee that they would possess the same insti-
tutions or population densities.
11I report results excluding absolute latitude in Table A3 in the appendix. Results are similar without this
control, though the quadratic term on population density becomes marginally insignificant in the slavery
equation. The population density at which slavery peaks, roughly 116 persons per square mile, is between
the 90th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.
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TABLE 2. Main results
[Table 2 here]
The control for fishing is included with the Pacific Northwest in mind. Here, groups
such as the Haida used slaves in fishing and hunting, and were able to capture them
using canoe raids (Donald, 1997). This region is well known for having a relatively high
surplus and developed material culture despite the lack of importance of agriculture.
For groups with easy access to fish and an economy not centered on agriculture, land
quality may be a poor measure of A¯ in the model. This is why Nieboer (1900) formulated
his view in terms of the abundance of resources in general.
4. RESULTS
4.1. In pictures. It is useful, first, to know whether the correlations predicted by the
model are apparent in the raw data. I divide the sample into percentiles of land quality
and historic population density. In Figure 4, I report the fraction of societies in each
percentile that have land rights. In Figure 5, I do the same for slavery. The raw correla-
tions are as predicted. Land rights are positively related to land quality and population
density. Slavery is positively correlated with land quality, though this is weaker than the
relationship for land rights. In the model, the existence of multiple steady states helps
explain this. Further, slavery is most prevalent in societies with intermediate population
densities.
4.2. Regressions. In Table 2, I report the results of estimating (5), (6) and (7). Specifi-
cally, I report marginal effects. For land quality, these can be interpreted as the effects of
a one standard deviation improvement. When additional controls are added, the results
suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in land quality raises the probability
that land rights exist by roughly 4.6%. Interpreting the coefficient on population density
as an elasticity, a 1% increase in population density is associated with a 0.124% increase
in the chance that land rights exist.12 A one standard deviation increase in land quality
predicts a 4.7% increase in the chance of slavery. While the coefficients on the quadratic
term for population density are less easy to interpret, the inverted-U probability profile
visible in Figure 5 is visible here. The level of historic population density at which slav-
ery peaks, given by eβp1/(2βp2), is reported in the table. With controls, this is 71 persons
per square mile, which is between the 85th and the 90th percentiles of the data.
12This is a reasonable approximation, though not strictly correct, because the normalization is log(1+pop.
den.), not log(pop. den.).
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FIGURE 4. Land rights by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by twenty percentiles
of land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture is divided by similar percentiles
of population density.
5. ROBUSTNESS: WHAT THE MODEL CAN EXPLAIN
In this section, I show that the results in Section 4 are robust to several possible ob-
jections. I show that they can be replicated using alternative measures of land rights
and slavery, and that the measures used for the dependent variables are correlated with
other measures of these in other samples not large enough to be used for replicating
the results. Second, I show that similar results can be obtained using different estimates
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FIGURE 5. Slavery by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this into twenty percentiles
of land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture is divided by similar percentiles
of population density.
of both population density and land quality. Third, I show that the results generally
survive additional checks for the importance of influential observations, for the pos-
sible endogeneity of land quality, and for alternative clustering of the standard errors.
Fourth, while I acknowledge that the data provide only limited scope for testing the
model against alternative explanations of land rights and slavery, I argue that the model
performs well against notable competing theories.
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TABLE 3. Alternative measures of the dependent variables
[Table 3 here]
5.1. Alternative measures of the dependent variables. Land rights and slavery are sharp
indicators of the existence of these institutions. Land rights in particular exist for some
74% of societies in the data, but do not necessarily capture differences in how well de-
fined these rights are. I begin by demonstrating that my measure of land rights is posi-
tively correlated with v1726 in the SCCS, an indicator for whether land is mostly private.
Because v1726 is only available for 80 societies, I am not able to replicate the economet-
ric analysis with it. The results of regressing the existence of land rights on v1726 are
positive and significant, as reported in column (1) of Table 3.
Next, I use an indicator for whether the inheritance of land is patrilineal as an alter-
native measure of land rights.13 Following Goody (1969), this captures the degree to
which the control of real property is directed towards the nuclear family. Roughly, this
is one step along the transition from weakly defined to strongly defined rights in land.
Similarly, I use an indicator for whether land is inherited by sons.14 I show in columns
(2) through (5) of Table 3 that both of these are positively related to land quality and
population density, conditional on the other controls.
For slavery, I make similar tests. First, I show in column (6) of Table 3 that the main
measure of slavery is correlated with an indicator constructed from v919 of the SCCS for
the existence of large-scale slaveholding. In columns (7) through (10), I show that the re-
sults can be mostly replicated by constructing alternative measures of slavery from the
Ethnographic Atlas. Slavery is recorded as either “absent” (1), “incipient or nonhered-
itary” (2) “reported but type not identified” (3), or “hereditary and socially significant”
(4). I create a “slavery above incipient” dummy for whether V 70 > 2, and a “hereditary
slavery” dummy for V 70 = 4. The positive conditional correlation between land quality
and non-incipient slavery is still apparent, as are the hump-shaped relationships with
population density, though the link between land quality and hereditary slavery is small
and statistically insignificant.
5.2. Alternative measures of land quality and population density. I validate the use of
the land quality measure by showing that it is strongly correlated with three alternative
measures of land quality contained in the SCCS – v921, v924 and v928. This is reported
in columns (1) through (3) of Table 4.
13Like the indicator for land rights, this is constructed using V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property
(Land). This is equal to 1 if V74=4, V74=5, V74=6, or V74=7.
14This is equal to 1 if V74=7.
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TABLE 4. Alternative measures of land quality and population density
[Table 4 here]
Because of the uncertainties involved in reconstructing historical population density,
I replicate the results with alternative proxies. In column (4) of Table 4, I show that
the main measure of population density is correlated with an indicator of land short-
age (v1720) from the SCCS. In Columns (5) through (10), I show that the main results
for land rights and slavery can be replicated with three alternative measures of popula-
tion density – density in 1995, and densities computed using McEvedy and Jones (1978)
or ARVE as in (8). If the principal measure of historical population density is replaced
for Canada and the United States with the estimates reported in Ruff (2006), the results
(not reported) are very similar to those given in Table 2. If I do not weight these re-
gional densities, I find an inverse-U but insignificant relationship with slavery using the
McEvedy and Jones (1978) estimates, and a significant inverse-U using the ARVE data
(not reported).
In addition, there are two variables in the SCCS (v64 and v1130) that create indepen-
dent estimates of the population densities of several societies in the data. These are not
continuous measures, but instead categorize the societies into bins. While there are not
enough observations and the data are too coarse to replicate the econometric analy-
sis, I show in Figure 6 that these alternative measures have inverse-U relationships with
slavery.
Though any historical population density estimate is untrustworthy on its own. The
various measures here agree on two conclusions. Land rights have existed where pop-
ulation was densest, and slavery was most likely at intermediate values of population
density, as in the model and consistent with the literature on African history.
5.3. Other robustness checks. In Table 5, I test whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of influential observations and sub-samples. I begin by re-estimating the re-
sults by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and computing both leverage and dfbeta statis-
tics for the variables of interest. In the slavery quadratic, this calculated for the linear
term. In columns (1) through (4) and (11) through (14), it is clear that the results do
not depend on including these observations. In columns (5), (6), (15), and (16), I repli-
cate the results excluding both North and South America. The results are unchanged
excepting that the relationship between slavery and land quality becomes small and in-
significant. This is surprising, as slavery within the Americas was most prominent in
areas of the Pacific Northwest where agriculture was unimportant.
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FIGURE 6. Slavery by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
Dropping Europeans (columns 7-8 and 17-18) and their offshoots does not change the
results by much. Excluding non-agricultural societies (columns 9-10 and 19-20) com-
pletely eliminates the relationship between land quality and land rights, suggesting that
this is driven by better land quality permitting the existence of settled agriculture. This
highlights a mechanism by which societies move from SE to SS, rather than providing
evidence against the model.
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TABLE 5. Influential observations
[Table 5 here]
TABLE 6. Possible endogeneity of land quality
[Table 6 here]
No sub-set of the data are determining all of the results. In Table A1 in the appendix,
I list the most ten most influential societies by dfbeta for each of the major coefficients
of interest. The societies that drive the relationships between land rights and the two
variables of interest are not concentrated in any one region. For the correlation of land
quality with slavery, four of the ten most influential societies are slave-holding Ameri-
can Indian groups concentrated in the fertile parts of the prairies. For the positive coef-
ficient on the log of historical population density, three of the most influential societies
are moderately populated slave-owning societies of Central Asia. Three of the ten most
influential societies for the negative coefficient on the quadratic population term are in
densely-settled Northern India and do not possess slaves.
I am not concerned here with possible reverse causation of population density. The
model expects that population growth will respond to institutions, and I am only test-
ing a correlation between two endogenous variables. I am, however, potentially con-
cerned about the endogeneity of land quality. The FAO measure is an index of several
constraints, of which soil depth and soil fertility may be potentially human-caused. In
Table 6, I address this concern by controlling directly for these components. If the entire
relationship between the variables of interest and land quality can be explained by cor-
relation with these potentially endogenous components, it is evidence that the causal
inference may be spurious. The results show, however, that the result survives separat-
ing land quality into its separate parts.
Finally, I have reported results with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. How
sensitive is the statistical inference to correlations in the errors within possible clus-
ters of observations? I address this question in Table 7, clustering the standard errors
by ethnographic region (of which there are 60), by the principal country of the ethnic
group, or by that country’s global region as classified by the UN.15 The “robust” errors
are the baseline results. The results are generally stable, though clustering by country
pushes the p. values of the population quadratic to 0.15. The major exception is that
15Ethnic groups were classified according to the location of their centroid, and then obvious errors were
corrected manually. For example, the centroids for the Japanese and Annamese fall outside of Japan and
Vietnam, respectively.
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TABLE 7. Alternative clusters (p. values)
[Table 7 here]
slavery is not significantly related to land quality if the results are made robust to arbi-
trary correlation by country or by UN region. This foreshadows the results of Section 6,
suggesting that there are strong correlations in institutions within broad regions.
5.4. Other theories of land rights. In this section, I contrast the model with other ex-
planations of land rights. The two most influential are those of Boserup (1965) and
Demsetz (1967). Boserup (1965) argues that exogenous population increase is the prin-
cipal driver of agricultural intensification and more permanent tenure. This is the in-
tuition captured by the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model; an increase in Pt pushes down the av-
erage product of land under egalitarianism, creating incentives for the elite to enclose
it. Other formalizations of this argument have captured these changes as the selection
of a new, more intensive production technology in response to changes in the relative
scarcity of land and labor (e.g. Hayami (1997); Quisumbing and Otsuka (2001)).
The strong correlation of population density and land rights identified in Section 4
supports this view. Further, this result supports the model against informal critiques
of Boserup (1965) that have argued that population pressure can lead to multiple out-
comes, including open access (e.g. Baland and Platteau (1998)). The tendency in the
data is for population pressure to be associated with more defined rights. These data do
not, of course, allow the model to be tested against all possible mechanisms by which
population density is positively correlated with the existence of rights over land. Specific
alternatives can be evaluated. It may be supposed, for example, that population density
affects land rights only through the existence of states. Re-estimating (6) separately for
stateless societies and those with states, however, gives a positive and significant coeffi-
cient on historic population density in both sub-samples (not shown).16
Demsetz (1967), by contrast, focuses on trade. He argues that land rights internalize
externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. This drives enclosure of the commons
in the formal treatments of Hotte et al. (2000) or Copeland and Taylor (2009), and ex-
plains the empirical results of Bogart and Richardson (2010). It is similar to the greater
effort expended in defending rights over more valuable resources predicted by models
of the economics of conflict (e.g. Baker (2003); Grossman and Kim (1995)). These mo-
tivations are not inconsistent with the land abundance view, and are incorporated into
Austin’s (2008a) account of it. The data do not include direct information on trade. The
16“Stateless” societies and those with states are defined according to V 33 of the Ethnographic Atlas, which
captures jurisdictional hierarchy above the local community
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TABLE 8. Alternative theories
[Table 8 here]
two controls that best capture trade in the data – distance from the coast and access to
a major river – do not significantly predict the existence of land rights in Table 2.
Beyond these two influential theories, there is a literature on the enclosure of com-
mon property (e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham
(1980); Lueck (1994); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)). These works identify
several benefits of common property that help explain why it survives. These include
scale economies, risk pooling, exclusion and effort costs, and equity concerns. None of
these explanations exclude land abundance as an explanation of weakly defined land
rights. Most of these variables are not available in the data, making it impossible to test
the land abundance view against them. The exception to this is risk. In Table 8, I add a
measure of ecological risk, including the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall over
the period 1950-1999.17 In column (1), there is a significant negative coefficient; without
additional controls, it does appear that added risk helps explain a lack of rights to land,
though this does not diminish the direct effect of land quality. Adding log population
density or the full set of controls, however, leads the effect of risk to become insignifi-
cant.
5.5. Other theories of slavery. Several theoretical analyses of slavery and coercion ex-
ist (e.g. Barzel (1977); Bergstrom (1971); Canarella and Tomaske (1975); Findlay (1975);
Genicot (2002)). Some, e.g. Conning (2004), formally capture the same intuition as
Nieboer (1900) or Domar (1970), which is the basis of the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model. In this
section, I contrast the results outlined in Section 4 with two other broad explanations of
slavery.
First, several theories emphasize coerced workers’ outside options. These include
what Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) refer to as the “neo-Malthusian” explanations of
the decline of serfdom. North and Thomas (1971), for example, hold that serfs volun-
tarily exchanged their labor for protection from lords. These payments were in inputs
rather than money because of the limited nature of output markets. Critically, North and
Thomas (1971) suggest that lower population densities after the black death led lords
17Data here come from the University of Delaware Center for Climatic Research.
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to compete for labor, weakening serfdom.18 Several models find that worse outside op-
tions for workers increase the degree of coercion in labor contracts (Beber and Blattman,
2011; Chwe, 1990; Naidu and Yuchtman, 2011). Similarly, Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011)
find that labor scarcity has two effects, raising coercion through a Domar-type increase
in the price of output, but also reducing coercion by improving workers’ outside options.
If workers’ outside options help explain the existence of slavery, this does not rule out
labor scarcity as an explanation. Workers’ outside options are not directly observed in
the data, making it impossible to test the model against this explanation directly. Fol-
lowing the narrative of Nunn and Puga (2011), ruggedness is expected to improve the
outside option of slaves by making it easier for them to flee. Contrary to this intuition,
however, the marginal effect ruggedness on slavery in Table 2 is positive.
There are four reasons North and Thomas (1971) cannot explain Africa. First, Fenoal-
tea (1975), who demonstrates that they err in treating serfdom as voluntary, underes-
timate the transactions costs in labor contracts, misidentify the historical trends that
acted on the manorial system, and overemphasize the rigidity of “custom.” Second, I
show land quality and population density at low levels are positively associated with
slavery. North and Thomas (1971) predict these would promote the development of
trade and markets, lessening the need for contracts to be written in labor dues. Third,
their prediction that trade will discourage the use of serfs runs counter to African his-
tory, in which external trade spurred greater use of slaves in production (e.g. Lovejoy
(2000) or Law (1995)). Finally, there is no evidence that African slaves received pay-
ments that approximated their marginal products. In many cases, slaveowners had to
be compelled to receive manumission payments.
The second set of theories I address argue that, in certain contexts, slavery is more
productive than free labor, which explains its use. For Fenoaltea (1984), this occurs
where “pain incentives” are effective and detailed care by the worker is unnecessary.
Fogel and Engerman (1974) link the exceptional productivity of slaves in the American
south to economies of scale that could only be achieved through gang labor, an activity
so grueling that free men could not be induced to take part at any price. Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997), similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with economies of scale is
more conducive to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentration of slaves in rural
and domestic production by invoking the high turnover costs in these industries.
18Writers such as Inikori (1999) have suggested that African “slaves” held a position closer to that of the
European serf. In the model, slaves differ from free laborers in that they are coerced workers whose price
does not depend on the local supply of labor. The severity of slavery is not important to this conceptual
distinction.
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These arguments again cannot alone explain slavery in Africa, even if they can ex-
plain it in other contexts. First, there is no evidence that slaves were used in production
in sectors systematically different than those dominated by free peasants. Studies of
slavery in individual African societies frequently make reference to slave labor and free
labor working in the same tasks. Austin (2005) notes gold and kola production in Asante
were both carried out by free people, pawns, corve´e labor, slaves, and descendants of
slaves. Uchendu (1979) shows for Igbo society that “[i]n domestic activities ... no opera-
tion was strictly reserved for slaves.” Describing the Kerebe of Tanzania, Hartwig (1979)
writes that masters often worked alongside their slaves, who performed the same tasks
as their owners and their owners’ wives. Second, the literature on the “legitimate com-
merce” period suggests that slaves were used in the activities where labor of all kinds was
most productive; in the model this is consistent with a rise in A¯, and does not require
a different production function under slavery. The nineteenth century export markets
for oils, ivory, ostrich feathers and other goods created higher returns to slave labor, and
slavery within Africa intensified (Law, 1995; Lovejoy, 2000; Lynn, 1997) Third, African
agriculture both past and present has been overwhelmingly characterized by diminish-
ing or constant returns to scale (Hopkins, 1973). Without evidence of scale economies,
an appeal to “pain incentives” is not necessary to explain slavery over and above a com-
parison of the costs of slavery to those of free labor.
The data only allow limited tests of the land abundance view against these arguments,
since economies of scale or the detailed care needed in production are not observed.
The FAO does, however, report the suitability of land for eight classes of rainfed crop –
wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, oil crops, sugar, and cotton. I test whether
including these measures in the slavery regressions has any effect on the results. This
tests the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model against the alternative that slavery is explained by its
productivity in the production of specific crops. I report the results in Table 8. With one
exception, none of these specific crops has a major impact on the coefficient on land
quality. The exception is maize suitability, which weakens the effect of land quality,
making it marginally insignificant. Since the main effect of maize is itself insignificant
and the two variables have a high raw correlation of 0.44, this is likely the result of multi-
collinearity.
6. HETEROGENEITY: WHAT THE MODEL CANNOT EXPLAIN
In Table 9, I show a simple method to do away with most of the results presented so
far: add fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions in the data. These are North
America, South America, Africa, the Circum-Mediterranean, the Insular Pacific, and
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TABLE 9. Results with region fixed effects
[Table 9 here]
TABLE 10. Galton’s problem
[Table 10 here]
East Eurasia. There is still a relationship between population density and land rights,
and the marginal effect of land quality on slavery has not fallen by much, but the other
results have now disappeared completely. The model can predict differences across
broad regions, but not within them.
Why? Anthropologists have a name for the diffusion of institutions across societies:
“Galton’s problem.” Economists would refer to this as serial correlation or spatial depen-
dence. I propose that the lack of robustness of the main results stems from spillovers. If
a nearby society has slavery, it is almost impossible to avoid developing the institution or
becoming slaves of your neighbor, regardless of prevailing land quality and population
density. The existence of rights over land is an idea that can spread across societies, and
can be used to defend claims against a rival group. Within the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model,
these make sense as parameter shifts dependent on a neighboring group’s institutions.
The cost of slavery (γ), for example, should be lower if a slave who flees can only do so
to another slave-holding society.
In Table 10, I provide suggestive evidence that these neighbor effects exist by esti-
mating spatial lag and spatial error models. The spatial lag adds a term ρWy to the
estimating equation. W is an N × N spatial weight matrix, in which each entry Wij is
the inverse of the distance between observation i and observation j, normalized so that
its rows sum to 1 or 0. ρ captures whether the institutional outcome of one group will
affect its neighbor’s institutions. The reason this evidence is only suggestive is that ρ
is not separately identified from localized unobservables. This is estimated as a linear
probability model using maximum likelihood.19 The spatial error model is similar. Now,
the error term is given by u = λWu+ , so that a society’s random error may depend on
the error terms for societies that are close to it.
In Table 10 it is clear that there is very strong spatial correlation in land rights. The
Wald tests for ρ and λ are very large, even conditional on the observed controls. Once
controls are added, none of the results concerning land quality survive. The results with
population density fare better, but for slavery these are only marginally significant in
19In particular, I use the spatreg command in Stata.
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the spatial lag model. While the model can explain differences across regions, it can-
not explain differences within them, and the strong spatial correlation in institutional
outcomes suggests this is due to neighbor effects.
I confirm the ability of the model to explain differences across regions in Figures 7
and 8. I show that the relationships between the averages of land quality and popula-
tion density within an ethnographic region are correlated with the fraction of societies
possessing land rights or slavery as the model predicts. The positive relationships of
land rights with both land quality and population density are still apparent, and the
inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density is still apparent. Only the
correlation between slavery and land quality cannot be seen across regions in the data.
Once again, the existence of multiple steady states can explain this. In Table A2, in the
appendix, I report the regional means for these variables for the six major regions of the
Ethnographic Atlas.
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
It appears then, that, the land abundance view performs reasonably well in predict-
ing broad differences in the prevalence of land rights and slavery between Africa and
the rest of the world, though not as well at predicting outcomes within regions. What of
other institutions discussed by historians of Africa? The relative lack of state centraliza-
tion and high rates of polygyny have also been tied to sparse population. Rulers were
unable to tie subjects to the land and tax them, sought subjects and cattle, rather than
territory, and had to contend with the ability of subjects to exit easily (Austin, 2004a,b).
Goody (1976) argues that polygyny exists where allocating land to additional wives is
less costly but their labor is valuable.
In Table 11, I replicate (5), (6) and (7) with states and polygamy as outcomes. The
prevalence of states in the global sample mimics that of rights over land, rising mono-
tonically with land quality and population density.20 Polygyny, by contrast, mimics the
pattern seen for slavery – its presence increases weakly with land quality, but is strongest
at intermediate levels of population.21 The relationships between polygyny and the con-
trols of interest are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls – malaria ecology is
sufficient to make either one insignificant. This suggests that the land abundance view
may have some power to explain the relative prevalence of states, though its application
to polygamy may be more limited.
20I measure state centralization as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 33 in the Ethnographic Atlas,
the levels of jurisdiction above the local, is greater than one.
21I measure polygyny as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 9 in the Ethnographic Atlas, marital
composition, is 3, 4, 5, or 6. This codes outcome 2, “Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny”, as zero.
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FIGURE 7. Land rights, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with land rights. The x axis in the top picture is
average land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
TABLE 11. Other outcomes
[Table 11 here]
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geography
affects institutions – by looking in depth at one hypothesis from the literature on African
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FIGURE 8. Slavery, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with slavery. The x axis in the top picture is average
land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
history. I find that African land tenure and slavery have been decisively shaped by the
continent’s abundance of land and scarcity of labor. I find that this perspective explains
much about institutions across a global cross-section of societies, but that neighbor ef-
fects weaken its ability to predict differences within them.
These tests have made several points that must be taken into account in understand-
ing the impacts of under-population on African institutions. First, when both produc-
tivity and population are low, the opportunity cost of coercion is high, and the benefit
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to creating estates is low. This explains why slavery is less common among the most
sparsely populated societies. Africa appears not as the least populous region in the sam-
ple, but as one that of medium density. While it is comparatively more prone to slavery
than Europe or South Asia, there the is more slavery on the continent than in many parts
of the Americas. Second, greater land quality (as well as access to trade), will encour-
age increased reliance on slavery conditional on population. This explains why some of
the most agriculturally prosperous though densely populated regions in Africa, such as
Sokoto, also used slaves most intensively (cf. Hill (1985)). Finally, there are substantial
institutional spatial correlations across African societies relating to land rights and slav-
ery. These revisions to the current thinking allow the “land abundance” perspective to
better explain institutions and are borne out in comparative data.
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Mean s.d. Min Max N Pct.
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,041 5 0.03 0.29 0.05
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801 10 0.09 0.60 0.18
Land quality 1.33 0.90 0 3.98 1,206 15 0.28 1.21 0.28
Date observed 1,905 53.0 1,500 1,965 1,206 20 0.57 1.93 0.50
Historic pop density 42.8 141 0 3,627 1,206 25 1.22 2.58 0.94
Precipitation 1,263 858 12.6 6,164 1,206 30 2.42 3.87 2.00
Temperature 7,203 2,774 35.5 10,830 1,206 35 3.71 5.08 3.87
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,206 40 5.82 6.64 7.13
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0 0.69 1,206 45 7.75 8.29 10.21
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.87 0 16.5 1,206 50 10.14 10.14 14.81
Elevation 167 9.61 141 230 1,206 55 12.63 13.16 19.39
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,206 60 15.85 17.38 24.35
Ruggedness 121,122 132,811 137 977,941 1,206 65 20.17 22.60 32.30
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,206 70 26.07 29.88 40.24
Mostly fishing 0.069 0.25 0 1 1,206 75 35.40 39.17 54.98
80 47.25 53.66 76.03
85 63.27 71.90 105.73
90 96.09 116.78 151.86
95 164.72 198.82 246.07
Notes: Variable definitions in text.
Table 1: Summary statistics and percentiles of population density
HYDE 
Estimate MJ Base
ARVE 
Base
Land quality 0.091*** (0.017) 0.046*** (0.018)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.161*** (0.010) 0.124*** (0.011)
Precipitation -0.047** (0.021) -0.022 (0.021)
Temperature -0.028 (0.030) -0.057* (0.032)
Date observed 0.050*** (0.019) 0.004 (0.016)
Share desert 0.010 (0.018) 0.039** (0.016)
Dist. to coast -0.023 (0.018) 0.009 (0.018)
Elevation -0.007 (0.019) 0.002 (0.018)
Pct. malarial 0.174*** (0.026) 0.127*** (0.025)
Ruggedness 0.064*** (0.017) 0.030* (0.016)
Absolute latitude -0.107*** (0.033) -0.088** (0.037)
Major river -0.031 (0.034) -0.079** (0.034)
Mostly fishing -0.125* (0.074) 0.029 (0.071)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Land quality 0.040*** (0.015) 0.047** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.286*** (0.029) 0.109*** (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.042*** (0.005) -0.013* (0.007)
Precipitation -0.063** (0.025) -0.047* (0.026)
Temperature 0.218*** (0.038) 0.217*** (0.038)
Date observed -0.049*** (0.019) -0.065*** (0.021)
Share desert 0.033 (0.022) 0.030 (0.020)
Dist. to coast 0.048** (0.023) 0.054** (0.024)
Elevation 0.013 (0.022) 0.014 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.386*** (0.030) 0.360*** (0.030)
Ruggedness 0.135*** (0.021) 0.121*** (0.022)
Absolute latitude 0.111*** (0.042) 0.136*** (0.043)
Major river 0.089** (0.042) 0.083* (0.042)
Mostly fishing 0.388*** (0.078) 0.416*** (0.081)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Pop. den. at peak slavery 30.76 71.14
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any slavery
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Table 2. Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any land rights
Land mostly private (v1726 in SCCS) 0.301**
(0.144)
Land quality 0.050** 0.051**
(0.023) (0.022)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.123*** 0.183***
(0.015) (0.016)
Observations 80 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any slavery
Large scale slaveholding (v919 in SCCS) 0.538***
(0.166)
Land quality 0.037* 0.014
(0.021) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.218*** 0.100***
(0.042) (0.029)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.027*** -0.011**
(0.007) (0.005)
Observations 166 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
Table 3: Alternative measures of the dependent variables
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with
marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Land is patrilineal Land inherited by sons
Slavery above incipient Hereditary slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land 
quality 
(v921)
Land 
quality 
(v924)
Land 
quality 
(v928)
Land 
scarcity 
(v1720)
Land quality 1.677*** 0.703*** 0.871***
(0.254) (0.112) (0.107)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.080***
(0.030)
Observations 172 172 172 79
R-squared 0.223 0.196 0.274
Other cont. N N N N
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln pop density 1995 0.098*** 0.123***
(0.010) (0.046)
     squared. -0.013**
(0.006)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - MJ Base 0.124*** 0.122***
(0.011) (0.040)
     squared. -0.012*
(0.007)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - ARVE Base 0.124*** 0.109***
(0.011) (0.038)
     squared. -0.013*
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, excepting columns 1-3, with marginal effects reported. Columns 1-3 are OLS. Other
controls are as in the table of main results.
Table 4: Alternative measures of land quality and population density
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.084***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027)
Soil depth constraints 0.095*** 0.053**
(0.019) (0.021)
Soil fertility constraints 0.020 0.074***
(0.018) (0.026)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 6: Possible endogeneity of land quality
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clustering
Land quality Robust 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
Ethno. Region 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02
Country 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.08
UN Region 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.10
ln(1+pop. den.) Robust 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethno. Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
UN Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. Robust 0.00 0.05
Ethno. Region 0.00 0.05
Country 0.00 0.15
UN Region 0.00 0.09
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y N Y
Notes: All regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in
the table of main results.
Table 7: Alternative clusters (p. values)
Any land rights Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.079*** 0.045**
(0.017) (0.018)
Rainfall CV -0.311** 0.042 -0.120 0.009
(0.143) (0.113) (0.138) (0.138)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.162*** 0.124***
(0.010) (0.012)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N N Y Y
Other crop Wheat Maize Cereals 
Roots/ 
tubers Pulses Oil crops Sugar Cotton 
Land quality 0.041* 0.036 0.048** 0.057*** 0.039* 0.071*** 0.049** 0.041*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Other crop suitability 0.012 0.036 -0.004 -0.045* 0.032 -0.074*** -0.033 0.042*
(0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.012* -0.012* -0.013* -0.012* -0.013* -0.014** -0.013* -0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Other crop suitability 0.008 0.036 0.004 -0.042 0.032 -0.059** -0.037 0.048*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Corr(Land  qual., suit.) 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.42 0.50 0.21 0.30
Any slavery
Table 8: Alternative theories
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.014 0.037
(0.018) (0.023)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.103*** 0.017
(0.013) (0.042)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.005
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 9: Results with region fixed effects
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial error model
Land quality 0.031** 0.017 0.006 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.047
(0.010) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.018*** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wald test (λ=0) 726.5 387.7 580.6 233.9 1556 1567 668.0 689.6
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Spatial lag model
Land quality 0.029** 0.017 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.033
(0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.028)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.014*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Wald test (ρ=0) 618.2 186.3 207.2 69.87 1517 1003 243.2 246.6
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 10: Galton's problem
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.157*** 0.180*** 0.266*** -0.042
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.046*** -0.002
(0.006) (0.007)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 11: Other outcomes
Any state centralization Polygyny is usual
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
APPENDICES NOT FOR PUBLICATION
1. DATA APPENDIX
1.1. Definitions and sources of ethnographic data. Six variables are computed from
the Ethnographic Atlas:
(1) Any slavery is an indicator for whether V 70, “Type of Slavery” is greater than 1,
which indicates “absence or near absence.” The other categories grouped to-
gether are “incipient or nonhereditary,” “reported but type not identified,” and
“hereditary and socially significant.”
(2) Any land rights is an indicator for whether V 74, “Inheritance Rule for Real Prop-
erty (land)” is greater than 1, which indicates “absence of individual property
rights.” The other categories grouped together are, first, “matrilineal (sister’s
sons),” second, “other matrilineal heirs,” third, “children, with daughters receiv-
ing less,” fourth, “children, equally for both sexes,” fifth, “other patrilineal heirs,”
and, sixth, “patrilineal (sons).”
(3) State centralization is an indicator for whether V 33, “Jurisdictional Hierarchy Be-
yond Local Community” is greater than zero. This variable ranges from zero lev-
els to four levels.
(4) Usual polygyny is an indicator for whether V 9 “Marital Composition: Monogamy
and Polygamy,’ is equal to 3 (Preferentially sororal, same dwelling), 4 (Preferen-
tially sororal, separate dwelling), 5 (Non-sororal, separate dwellings), or 6 (Non-
sororal, same dwelling). This excludes categories 1 (Independent nuclear, monog-
amous), 2 (Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny) and 7 (Independent polyan-
drous families).
(5) Date observed is the rough date at which the information on the society was
recorded. Where this is missing, I impute it using the average value for other
ethnic groups within the society’s ethnographic region, of which there are 60 in
the final sample. This is variable V 102 in the atlas.
(6) Mostly fishing is an indicator for whether the society’s percentage dependence
on fishing is greater than 50%, computed from V 3 in the Ethnographic Atlas.
A revised version of the Atlas has been made available for download in SPSS format by
J. Patrick Gray at http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/. This is the version
used for the present study.
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Five variables are used from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. These are:
(1) v64: This is “Population Density.” This divides societies into categories of < 1,
1− 5, 5− 25, 26− 100, 101− 500, and > 500 persons per square mile.
(2) v921: This is “Agricultural Potential 1: Sum of Land Slope, Soils, Climate Scales.”
It rates land quality on a scale between 4 and 23.
(3) v924: This is “Suitability of Soils for Agriculture”. It ranges soils on a scale from 0
to 8, from “very poor” to “very fair.”
(4) v928: This is “Agricultural Potential 2: Lowest of Land Slope, Soils, Climate Scales.”
It ranges soils on a scale from 0 to 8, from “very poor” to “very fair.”
(5) v1130: This is “Population Density.” This divides societies into categories of < 1,
1− 5, 5− 25, 26− 100, 101− 500, and > 500 persons per square mile.
(6) v1720: This is “land shortage,” computed by converting the variable “Causes of
Land Shortage” to 0 if there is “no land shortage” and 1 if there is “population
pressure”, “territorial invasions,” or both.
The SCCS is available online at http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/sccs/.
1.2. Definitions and sources of population data. The principal data for historic popu-
lation density, from HYDE, are online at ftp://ftp.mnp.nl/hyde/hyde31_final/.
The raster data for population density in 1995, used to compute alternative historic
population density, are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/
index.htm. Regional estimates from ? are ? are not available online. The regional esti-
mates from ? are available at http://ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=
pop_landuse_data.tar.gz. The UNEP estimates for Africa in 1960 can be downloaded
from http://na.unep.net/metadata/unep/GRID/AFPOP60.html.
In constructing regional estimates from ? and ?, I impute values for intermediate
years or years between the end of the data and 1995 exponentially. Where ? report
country-level estimates in recent years and broad regions (e.g. “The Sahel States”) in
earlier years, I divide the population among countries according to their ratio in the
earliest year that they are separately reported. Population density estimates for 1995
were obtained from the World Bank for country-level regions, and populstat.info for
sub-national regions.
1.3. Definitions and sources of GIS data. The main measure of land quality has been
explained in detail in the text. The ? alternative measure of land quality is available at
http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/.
Major river : This is a dummy that equals one if a river with a rank of at least 6 ac-
cording to the North American Cartographic Information Society (NACIS) intersects the
ethnic group’s territory. The data are taken from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/.
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Dist. to coast : This is average distance from each point in the ethnic group’s territory
to the nearest point on the coast, in decimal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
Elevation: This is average elevation for the ethnic group. Raster data are provided by
the NACIS, downloaded from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/.
Pct. malarial: This is the fraction of the society’s territory in which malaria is en-
demic, according to the Malaria Atlas Project, downloaded from http://www.map.ox.
ac.uk/data/.
Precipitation: This is average annual precipitation (mm). Because some societies
are too small for a raster point to fall within their territory, I impute missing data us-
ing the nearest raster point. The data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/
Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
Ruggedness: This is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by ?. This measures the
elevation distance between a raster cell and its neighbors. The data are downloaded
from http://diegopuga.org/data/.
Temperature: This is the accumulated temperature on days with mean daily temper-
ature above 0◦C, computed using monthly data from 1961 to 2000 collected by the Cli-
mate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. I treat 55537 is as an error
code and drop these points. I impute missing values using the nearest raster point. The
data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
Absolute latitude: This is the absolute value of the latitude of the society’s centroid.
Rainfall C.V.: This is the coefficient of variation of annual total rainfall over the pe-
riod 1950-1999 for the point in the rainfall data closest to the ethnic group’s centroid.
These data are taken from the University of Delaware’s Center for Climatic Research, and
are downloaded from http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/html_pages/archive.
html.
Other crop suitability. This is average suitability for the chosen rain-fed crop, accord-
ing to plates 29 through 36 of the FAO’s GAEZ project. For comparison, the general
land quality measure used in this paper is computed from plate 28. For each of these
crops, suitability is a scale between 0 and 8, where 0 indicates very high suitability and
8 indicates non-suitability. This is re-scaled so that larger values indicate greater suit-
ability, and is (like the other controls) converted to a standard normal variable for the
regressions. The data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/
GAEZ/index.htm.
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2. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The additional parameters are c¯, subsistence consumption, β, the exponent on fertil-
ity in the utility function, α, the exponent on productivity-augmented land in the pro-
duction function, γ, the marginal cost of guarding slaves, q, the marginal cost of fertility,
D, the coefficient on population and existing technology in the equation for techno-
logical progress, and θ, the exponent on population in the equation for technological
progress.
Three parameters of the model give ambiguous predictions. An increase in β will
make LS(Pt) and LE/F (Pt) flatter. This will not have any effect for a given At and Pt. In
the steady state, this can make slavery appear if LS(Pt) rotates downwards to intersect
LA(Pt), but can also make slavery disappear if LS(Pt) rotates downwards so that it no
longer intersects SS. For the same reason, the steady state effect on land rights will be
ambiguous. The effects of an increase in q will be the opposite of those for an increase in
β, and will be indeterminate for the same reasons. An increase in α can lead Ψ(Pt) and
Φ(Pt) to rotate upwards or downwards depending on the values of all the parameters.
The remaining parameters give clearer predictions. An increase in γ will cause both
Ψ(Pt) and Ω(Pt) to become steeper, shrinking the slavery region. Both in the steady state
and for given values ofAt andPt, this makes both slavery and land rights less likely. Rais-
ing θwill makeLA(Pt) rotate downwards. This will have no impact for a particularAt and
Pt. It will make a steady state under slavery less likely, since LA(Pt) may tilt downwards
so that it no longer intersects LS(Pt). It will also push the intersection of LE/F (Pt) and
LA(Pt) (if there is one) to the left, which may move the steady state from SF to SE. This
will make slavery and land rights less likely in the steady state. RaisingD will have oppo-
site effects. An increase in c¯will lead Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt) and Φ(Pt) to become steeper, shrinking
both the free labor and slavery regions. It will also causeLS(Pt) to become steeper. For a
given At and Pt and in the steady state, this will make slavery and land rights less likely.
Dep. variable
RHS variable
Omaha Prairie Pawnee Prairie
Cheremis Eastern Europe Fox Prairie
Guanche North Africa Miami Prairie
Yalunka Western Sudan Omaha Prairie
Mbuti African Hunters Matakam Nigerian Plateau
Ramcocame Eastern Brazil Makah Northwest Coast
Djuka Guiana Bachama Moslem Sudan
Walbiri Australia Macassare Western Indonesia
Fang Equatorial Bantu Gude Nigerian Plateau
Dep. variable
RHS variable
Yucatecma Central America Obostyak Arctic Asia Obostyak Arctic Asia
Bribri Central America Chahar Central Asia Bengali North and Central India
Guanche North Africa Menomini Prairie Uttarprad North and Central India
Keraki New Guinea Goldi Arctic Asia Goldi Arctic Asia
Banaro New Guinea Turkmen Central Asia Balinese Eastern Indonesia
Cheremis Eastern Europe Bengali North and Central India Santal North and Central India
Gidjingal Australia Hamyan North Africa Chahar Central Asia
Kaoka Western Melanesia Buryat Central Asia Kerala South India
Yanomamo Lower Amazon Mzab Sahara Menomini Prairie
Notes: For the regressions with the full set of controls in Table 2, these are the most influential observations in terms of dfbeta.
Land rights Slavery
Land rights Slavery Slavery
ln(1+pop. den.) ln(1+pop. den.) ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd.
Land quality Land quality
Table A1: Influential observations
Region Any land rights Any slavery
Land quality 
(N (0,1))
Historic 
population 
density N
Africa 0.93 0.83 0.09 2.97 414
Circum-Mediterranean 0.92 0.70 0.00 3.21 157
East Eurasia 0.83 0.54 0.07 3.87 123
Insular Pacific 0.73 0.24 0.46 2.43 119
North America 0.29 0.27 -0.33 0.77 284
South America 0.27 0.27 -0.05 1.23 109
Table A2: Outcomes by Major Region
Notes: Each entry reports the fraction of societies in the region that possess land rights or slavery, or the average land
quality (normalized to be N(0,1)) or historic population density in the region. "N" refers to the sample for which historic
population density is not missing.
% of societies with: Mean of:
Land quality 0.044** (0.017) 0.049** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.124*** (0.012) 0.087** (0.037)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.009 (0.006)
Precipitation -0.025 (0.020) -0.007 (0.021) -0.083*** (0.025) -0.072*** (0.025)
Temperature 0.045** (0.022) 0.005 (0.020) 0.139*** (0.027) 0.125*** (0.028)
Date observed 0.051*** (0.019) 0.004 (0.016) -0.051*** (0.019) -0.067*** (0.022)
Share desert 0.008 (0.017) 0.036** (0.016) 0.036 (0.022) 0.031 (0.020)
Dist. to coast -0.011 (0.018) 0.016 (0.018) 0.038* (0.023) 0.041* (0.024)
Elevation -0.005 (0.019) 0.005 (0.018) 0.010 (0.022) 0.011 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.196*** (0.025) 0.142*** (0.024) 0.362*** (0.027) 0.334*** (0.027)
Ruggedness 0.070*** (0.016) 0.036** (0.016) 0.129*** (0.021) 0.115*** (0.022)
Major river -0.043 (0.034) -0.088** (0.034) 0.101** (0.042) 0.097** (0.043)
Mostly fishing -0.176** (0.071) -0.014 (0.067) 0.437*** (0.077) 0.469*** (0.081)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Pop. den. at peak slavery 116.1
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported.
Table A3. Main results without absolute latitude
(1) (2)
Any land rights
(3) (4)
Any slavery
